On snubbing proximal intentions

Philosophical Studies:1-21 (forthcoming)

Authors
Alfred Mele
Florida State University
Abstract
In the simplest case, a proximal intention is an intention one has now to do something now. Recently, some philosophers have argued that proximal intentions do much less work than they are sometimes regarded as doing. This article rebuts these arguments, explains why the concept of proximal intentions is important for some scientific work on intentional action, and sketches an empirical approach to identifying proximal intentions. Ordinary usage of “intend” and the place of intention in folk psychology and scientific psychology are discussed.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1153-0
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References found in this work BETA

Persisting Intentions.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):735–757.
Choking and The Yips.David Papineau - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):295-308.

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