Physicalism: From supervenience to elimination

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (September):573-87 (1991)
Supervenience physicalism holds that all facts, of whatever type, globally supervene upon the physical facts, even though neither type-type nor token-token nonphysical-physical identities hold. I argue that, invoked like this, supervenience is metaphysically mysterious, needing explanation. I reject two explanations (Lewis and Forrest). I argue that the best explanation of the appearance of supervenience is an error-theoretic, projectivist one: there are no nonphysical properties, but we erroneously project such onto the physical world in a systematic way, yielding the appearance of supervenience
Keywords Eliminativism  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Qualia  Supervenience  Vocabulary
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DOI 10.2307/2107877
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