Philo 7 (2):131-137 (2004)
AbstractMy goal in this paper is to provide critical discussion of Michael Rea’s case for three of the controversial theses defended in his World Without Design (Oxford University Press, 2002): (1) that naturalism must be viewed as what he calls a “research program”; (2) that naturalism “cannot be adopted on the basis of evidence,” as he puts it; and (3) that naturalists cannot be justified in accepting realism about material objects.
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Citations of this work
Rea’s Revenge and the Persistent Problem of Persistence for Realism.Bradley Jay Strawser - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):375-391.
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