Searle's abstract argument against strong AI

Synthese 108 (3):391-419 (1996)
Authors
Andrew Melnyk
University of Missouri, Columbia
Abstract
  Discussion of Searle's case against strong AI has usually focused upon his Chinese Room thought-experiment. In this paper, however, I expound and then try to refute what I call his abstract argument against strong AI, an argument which turns upon quite general considerations concerning programs, syntax, and semantics, and which seems not to depend on intuitions about the Chinese Room. I claim that this argument fails, since it assumes one particular account of what a program is. I suggest an alternative account which, however, cannot play a role in a Searle-type argument, and argue that Searle gives no good reason for favoring his account, which allows the abstract argument to work, over the alternative, which doesn't. This response to Searle's abstract argument also, incidentally, enables the Robot Reply to the Chinese Room to defend itself against objections Searle makes to it
Keywords Artificial Intelligence  Metaphysics  Mind  Program  Robot  Strong  Searle, J
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413696
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References found in this work BETA

Minds, Brains and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Readings in Philosophy of Psychology.Ned Block (ed.) - 1980 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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Citations of this work BETA

Computation, Implementation, Cognition.Oron Shagrir - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):137-148.
Integrated Information Theory, Searle, and the Arbitrariness Question.Francis Fallon - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
The Logic of Searle's Chinese Room Argument.Robert I. Damper - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (2):163-183.

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