Two cheers for reductionism, or, the dim prospects for nonreductive materialism

Philosophy of Science 62 (3):370-88 (1995)
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I argue that a certain version of physicalism, which is viewed by both its admirers and its detractors as non-reductionist, in fact entails two claims which, though not reductionist in the currently most popular sense of 'reductionist', conform to the spirit of reductionism sufficiently closely to compromise its claim to be a comprehensively non-reductionist version of physicalism. Putatively non-reductionist versions of physicalism in general, I suggest, are likely to be non-reductionist only in some senses, but not in others, and hence to disappoint those who wish to be physicalists but still to remain soft and cuddly non-reductionists



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Andrew Melnyk
University of Missouri, Columbia

Citations of this work

A Theory of Sentience.Austen Clark (ed.) - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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1953 and all that. A tale of two sciences.Philip Kitcher - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):335-373.
Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):640-642.
The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism.Brian P. Mclaughlin - 1992 - In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. New York: W. de Gruyter. pp. 49-93.
Mental quausation.Terence Horgan - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:47-74.

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