Philosophy of Science 63 (3):S185-S193 (1996)

Andrew Melnyk
University of Missouri, Columbia
If physicalism is true (e.g., if every event is a fundamental-physical event), then it looks as if there is a fundamental-physical explanation of everything. If so, then what is to become of special scientific explanations? They seem to be excluded by the fundamental-physical ones, and indeed to be excellent candidates for elimination. I argue that, if physicalism is true, there probably is a fundamental-physical explanation of everything, but that nevertheless there can perfectly well be special scientific explanations as well, notwithstanding eliminativist scruples concerning overdetermination and Ockham's Razor
Keywords Eliminativism  Epistemology  Knowledge
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DOI 10.1086/289951
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