Public Affairs Quarterly 34 (2):169-184 (2020)

Leonhard Menges
University of Salzburg
Blame skeptics argue that we have strong reason to revise our blame practices because humans do not fulfill all the conditions for it being appropriate to blame them. This paper presents a new challenge for this view. Many have objected that blame plays valuable roles such that we have strong reason to hold on to our blame practices. Skeptics typically reply that non-blaming responses to objectionable conduct, like forms of disappointment, can serve the positive functions of blame. The new challenge is that skeptics need to show that it can be appropriate (or less inappropriate) to respond with this kind of disappointment to people’s conduct if it is inappropriate to respond with blame. The paper argues that current blame-skeptical views fail to meet this challenge.
Keywords blame  anger  disappointment  reactive attitudes  skepticism  Derk Pereboom  free will skepticism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt.Andreas Carlsson - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):89-115.
Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gideon Rosen - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):295–313.
Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Kind of Blame Skeptics Should Be Skeptical About.Leonhard Menges - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (6):401-415.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Emotion Account of Blame.Leonhard Menges - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):257-273.
There is a Distinctively Epistemic Kind of Blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):518-534.
Character and Blame in Hume and Beyond.Antti Kauppinen - 2016 - In Iskra Fileva (ed.), Questions of Character. Oxford University Press.
Is Epistemic Blame Distinct From Moral Blame?Daniella Meehan - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (2):183-194.
Hypocritical Blame, Fairness, and Standing.Cristina Roadevin - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (1-2):137-152.
Valuing Blame.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - In D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press.
Blame and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Adam Thompson - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1345-1364.
The Nature and Ethics of Blame.D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (3):197-207.
The Force and Fairness of Blame.Pamela Hieronymi - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):115–148.
Attending to Blame.Matt King - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1423-1439.
The Comparative Nonarbitrariness Norm of Blame.Daniel Telech & Hannah Tierney - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (1).


Added to PP index

Total views
133 ( #89,153 of 2,520,426 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #21,544 of 2,520,426 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes