Frege Numbers and the Relativity Argument

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):87-98 (1988)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Textual and historical subtleties aside, let's call the idea that numbers are properties of equinumerous sets ‘the Fregean thesis.’ In a recent paper, Palle Yourgrau claims to have found a decisive refutation of this thesis. More surprising still, he claims in addition that the essence of this refutation is found in the Grundlagen itself – the very masterpiece in which Frege first proffered his thesis. My intention in this note is to evaluate these claims, and along the way to shed some light on relevant passages of the Grundlagen. I will argue that Yourgrau does not make his case.The arguments with which we are concerned are found in the last three sections of Yourgrau's paper. A pervasive difficulty in these sections is that it is not clear exactly what Yourgrau is arguing against. The stated object of his attack is the Fregean thesis, a thesis about what numbers are; however, instead of a frontal assault, his strategy is to embark on a foray into the ill-defined issue of what it is that numbers number, where, roughly speaking, a number n numbers an object x just in case n can be legitimately assigned to x. The reason for this shift in emphasis appears to be rooted in a misconception. As we’ll see in more detail shortly, Yourgrau's argument against the Fregean thesis is based on an extension of a well known argument of Frege's found in §§22-3 of the Grundlagen, which Glenn Kessler has tagged the ‘relativity argument,’. According to Yourgrau, this is an argument ‘to the effect that what is literally numbered cannot simply be concrete objects’. This is incorrect. Frege himself clarifies the point of the argument in §21 with the following preface:In language, numbers (i.e., numerals] most commonly appear in adjectival form and attributive construction in the same sort of way as the words "hard" or "heavy" or "red," which have for their meanings properties of external things. It is natural to ask whether we must think of the individual numbers too as such properties, and whether, accordingly, the concept of number can be classed along with that, say, of color.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Euclid Strikes Back at Frege.Joongol Kim - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):20-38.
Ii. the origin of Frege's realism.Gregory Currie - 1981 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):448 – 454.
Frege and Dummett are two.Alex Oliver - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):74-82.
Frege on cardinality.Lila Luce - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (3):415-434.
What are numbers?Joongol Kim - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1099-1112.
What is Frege's Relativity Argument?Palle Yourgrau - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):137-172.
The Number of Planets, a Number-Referring Term?Friederike Moltmann - 2016 - In Philip A. Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 113-129.
Two Questions about the Revival of Frege's PROGRAMME.Jean-Jacques Szczeciniarz - 2004 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 11:195-197.
Frege's Approach to the Foundations of Analysis (1874–1903).Matthias Schirn - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):266-292.
Frege's Cardinals and Neo-Logicism.Roy T. Cook - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (1):60-90.
Frege's Performative Argument against Truth Relativism.Dirk Greimann - 2015 - Journal of the History of Analytic Philosophy 3:1-17.
A set theory with Frege-Russell cardinal numbers.Alan McMichael - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (2):141 - 149.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-04

Downloads
65 (#239,555)

6 months
2 (#1,136,865)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Menzel
Texas A&M University

References found in this work

What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
Quality and concept.George Bealer - 1982 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Child's Conception of Number.J. Piaget - 1953 - British Journal of Educational Studies 1 (2):183-184.
A theory of aggregates.Tyler Burge - 1977 - Noûs 11 (2):97-117.

View all 8 references / Add more references