Intentionalism about Moods

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136 (2013)

Authors
Angela Mendelovici
University of Western Ontario
Abstract
According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same kinds of ways that intentionalism about other kinds of states can be motivated. In this article, I respond to both challenges: First, I propose a novel intentionalist treatment of moods on which they represent unbound affective properties. Then, I argue that this view is indirectly supported by the same kinds of considerations that directly support intentionalism about other mental states
Keywords content  intentionality  emotions  moods  consciousness  intentionalism  mental representation  phenomenal character  representationalism
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.81
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References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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