Philosophia Christi 11 (1):93-110 (2009)

Authors
Angus John Louis Menuge
Concordia University Wisconsin
Abstract
Downward causation is controversial in the philosophy of mind. Some materialists argue that such causation is impossible because it violates the causal closure of the physical; is incompatible with natural law; and cannot be reconciled with the empirical evidence from neuroscience. This paper responds to these objections by arguing that there is no good reason to believe that the physical is causally closed; properly understood, natural laws are compatible with downward causation; and recent findings in neuroscience reported by Schwartz, Beauregard, and others provide strong empirical support for downward causation.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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DOI 10.5840/pc20091117
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