Moral Responsibility And Choice


Discussion of moral responsibility has traditionally centred around actions and the possibility of alternative actions. In this short paper I take a different approach and focus on choices rather than actions. I argue that a person is morally responsible directly for their choices and only indirectly for resulting actions. This subtle shift helps to clarify many issues such as moral luck, thwarted choice and coercion.



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References found in this work

Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1983 - Religious Studies 19 (1):96-99.

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