Moral Responsibility And Choice
Abstract
Discussion of moral responsibility has traditionally centred around actions and the possibility of alternative actions. In this short paper I take a different approach and focus on choices rather than actions. I argue that a person is morally responsible directly for their choices and only indirectly for resulting actions. This subtle shift helps to clarify many issues such as moral luck, thwarted choice and coercion.Author's Profile
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References found in this work
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1976 - The Monist 59 (2):204-217.
The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.