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| Abstract |
Discussion of moral responsibility has traditionally centred around actions and the possibility of alternative actions. In this short paper I take a different approach and focus on choices rather than actions. I argue that a person is morally responsible directly for their choices and only indirectly for resulting actions. This subtle shift helps to clarify many issues such as moral luck, thwarted choice and coercion.
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| Keywords | moral responsibility, choice, PAP, Principle of Alternate Possibilities, moral luck, trolley problem, Frankfurt cases |
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References found in this work BETA
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1976 - The Monist 59 (2):204-217.
The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 2003 - In G. Watson (ed.), Free Will. 2nd Edition. pp. 212-228.
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