Philosophy of Science 56 (4):642-663 (1989)

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Abstract
This paper examines a promising probabilistic theory of singular causation developed by David Lewis. I argue that Lewis' theory must be made more sophisticated to deal with certain counterexamples involving pre-emption. These counterexamples appear to show that in the usual case singular causation requires an unbroken causal process to link cause with effect. I propose a new probabilistic account of singular causation, within the framework developed by Lewis, which captures this intuition
Keywords lewis causation
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DOI 10.1086/289518
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References found in this work BETA

Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
A Probabilistic Theory of Causality.P. Suppes - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (4):409-410.

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Citations of this work BETA

Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 193.
Causation as a Secondary Quality.Peter Menzies & Huw Price - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):187-203.
Deterministic Chance.Luke Glynn - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):51–80.
Trumping Preemption.Jonathan Schaffer - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):165-181.

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