In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 135-157 (2013)
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Abstract |
Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which emotions and some moods represent intentional objects as having sui generis affective properties, which happen to be uninstantiated, and at least some moods represent affective properties not bound to any objects.
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Keywords | intentionalism moods emotions |
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Reprint years | 2014 |
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Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.
Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.David Bourget - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):381-408.
Representationalism, Perceptual Distortion and the Limits of Phenomenal Concepts.David Bourget - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36.
The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
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