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Possible Worlds
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013)
Abstract
This article includes a basic overview of possible world semantics and a relatively comprehensive overview of three central philosophical conceptions of possible worlds: Concretism (represented chiefly by Lewis), Abstractionism (represented chiefly by Plantinga), and Combinatorialism (represented chiefly by Armstrong).Author's Profile
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2013-11-01
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2013-11-01
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Citations of this work
Ontological Expressivism.Vera Flocke - 2021 - In J. T. M. Miller (ed.), The Language of Ontology. Oxford, UK:
God’s Necessity on Anselmian Theistic Genuine Modal Realism.Matthew James Collier - 2019 - Sophia 58 (3):331-348.
References found in this work
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs 2). Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
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