Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443 (2013)

Authors
Angela Mendelovici
University of Western Ontario
Abstract
It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them
Keywords Mental representation  Causal theories of mental representation  Teleological theories of mental representation  Asymmetric dependence  Reliable misrepresentation  Colors
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9966-8
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.
Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - In Alvin Goldman & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 337-363.

View all 34 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Biosemantics.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckerman (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 281--297.
Pictorial Representation: When Cognitive Science Meets Aesthetics.Mark Rollins - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (4):387 – 413.
Phenomenal Consciousness with Infallible Self-Representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-05-08

Total views
1,401 ( #2,811 of 2,432,317 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
100 ( #6,496 of 2,432,317 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes