Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation

Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443 (2013)
Abstract
It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them
Keywords Mental representation  Causal theories of mental representation  Teleological theories of mental representation  Asymmetric dependence  Reliable misrepresentation  Colors
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9966-8
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In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.
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