Philosophical Perspectives 5:475-507 (1991)
AbstractSuppose we believe that God created the world. Then surely we want it to be the case that he intended, in some sense at least, to create THIS world. Moreover, most theists want to hold that God didn't just guess or hope that the world would take one course or another; rather, he KNEW precisely what was going to take place in the world he planned to create. In particular, of each person P, God knew that P was to exist. Call this the "standard" conception. Most theists find the standard conception appealing. Unfortunately, the view seems to conflict with the equally appealing idea — call it "temporal actualism" — that there are no "future" individuals beyond those that already exist in the present moment. For, on this view, for any historical person P, prior to creation, there was no such person as P and hence nothing about P for God to know. Hence, in particular, God couldn't have known that P was to exist. This is of course not a new problem. But past solutions to it are highly problematic. In this paper, after canvassing previous approaches, I will propose a solution that seems to preserve both temporal actualism and a suitably robust form of the standard conception while avoiding the pitfalls of the past.
Similar books and articles
Time and Foreknowledge: A Critique of Zagzebski.L. Nathan Oaklander - 1995 - Religious Studies 31 (1):101 - 103.
Actualism, Ontological Commitment, and Possible World Semantics.Christopher Menzel - 1990 - Synthese 85 (3):355 - 389.
Spinoza’s Temporal Argument for Actualism.Harold Zellner - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:303-309.
Timeless Troubles: The Challenge of Prophecy to the Eternity Solution to the Foreknowledge/Freedom Dilemma.John J. Fitzgerald - 2008 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 82:203-215.
Singular Propositions and Modal Logic.Christopher Menzel - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (2):113-148.
Why Simple Foreknowledge Offers No More Providential Control Than the Openness of God.John Sanders - 1997 - Faith and Philosophy 14 (1):26-40.
``Why Simple Foreknowledge Offers No More Providential Control Than the Openness of God&Quot.John Sanders - 1997 - Faith and Philosophy 14 (1):26-40.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Divine Knowledge and Qualitative Indiscernibility.Daniel S. Murphy - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (1):25-47.
Theism and the Scope of Contingency.Timothy O'Connor - 2008 - Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 1:134-149.
References found in this work
No references found.