The Bridge Principle and Stigmatized Truth-Values

Topoi 40 (1):171-180 (2021)

Abstract

The Bridge Principle states that one shouldn’t assert a sentence that is indeterminate relative to possibilities that are still live options. This principle serves as a bridge between semantic and pragmatic presuppositions. I argue that, given the phenomenon of vagueness, the bridge principle cannot be true as formulated. An alternative formulation of the Bridge Principle is offered.

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Ricardo Ricardo Mena
National Autonomous University of Mexico

References found in this work

Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Princeton University Press.
Context.Robert Stalnaker - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Vagueness, Truth and Logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 1978 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 179.
Dynamic Predicate Logic.Jeroen Groenendijk & Martin Stokhof - 1991 - Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (1):39-100.

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