The Fundamental Theorem of World Theory

Journal of Philosophical Logic 43:333-363 (2014)
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Abstract

The fundamental principle of the theory of possible worlds is that a proposition p is possible if and only if there is a possible world at which p is true. In this paper we present a valid derivation of this principle from a more general theory in which possible worlds are defined rather than taken as primitive. The general theory uses a primitive modality and axiomatizes abstract objects, properties, and propositions. We then show that this general theory has very small models and hence that its ontological commitments—and, therefore, those of the fundamental principle of world theory—are minimal

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Author Profiles

Christopher Menzel
Texas A&M University
Edward Zalta
Stanford University

Citations of this work

Abstract Objects.Gideon Rosen - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Problem of Cross-World Predication.Alexander Kocurek - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (6):697-742.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.

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