Authors
Christopher Menzel
Texas A&M University
Abstract
In this paper I rehearse two central failings of traditional possible world semantics. I then present a much more robust framework for intensional logic and semantics based liberally on the work of George Bealer in his book Quality and Concept. Certain expressive limitations of Bealer's approach, however, lead me to extend the framework in a particularly natural and useful way. This extension, in turn, brings to light associated limitations of Bealer's account of predication. In response, I develop a more general and intuitively more adequate account of the logical form of predication.
Keywords intensional logic  property theory  structured propositions  predication
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2214116
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 56,141
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Deep Platonism.Chad Carmichael - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):307-328.
Relations.Fraser MacBride - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What Are Structural Properties?†.Johannes Korbmacher & Georg Schiemer - 2018 - Philosophia Mathematica 26 (3):295-323.
Upward Grounding.T. Scott Dixon - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):48-78.
Structured Propositions.Jeffrey C. King - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
101 ( #97,503 of 2,404,058 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #255,792 of 2,404,058 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes