Kantian Review 12 (1):61-89 (2007)

Authors
Melissa M Merritt
University of New South Wales
Abstract
The paper argues that existing interpretations of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as an "analysis of experience" (e.g., those of Kitcher and Strawson) fail because they do not properly appreciate the method of the work. The author argues that the Critique provides an analysis of the faculty of reason, and counts as an analysis of experience only in a derivative sense.
Keywords method of the Critique of Pure Reason  philosophical analysis
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DOI 10.1017/S1369415400000819
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Does Kant Demand Explanations for All Synthetic A Priori Claims?Colin Marshall - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (3):549-576.
Hegel on Kant's Analytic–Synthetic Distinction.Andrew Werner - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):502-524.

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Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1991 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.
The Role of Reflection in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.Houston Smit - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):203–223.

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