A Kantian critique of Kant's theory of punishment

Law and Philosophy 19 (3):311 - 338 (2000)
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In contrast to the traditional view of Kant as apure retributivist, the recent interpretations ofKant's theory of punishment (for instance Byrd's)propose a mixed theory of retributivism and generalprevention. Although both elements are literallyright, I try to show the shortcomings of each. I thenargue that Kant's theory of punishment is notconsistent with his own concept of law. Thus I proposeanother justification for punishment: specialdeterrence and rehabilitation. Kant's critique ofutilitarianism does not affect this alternative, whichmoreover has textual support in Kant and is fullyconsistent with his concept of law.



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Citations of this work

Against the Hybrid Interpretation of Kant’s Theory of Punishment.Mark Pickering - 2020 - Jahrbuch Für Recht Und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics 28 (1):115-133.
Kant-Bibliographie 2000.Margit Ruffing - 2002 - Kant Studien 93 (4):491-536.

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References found in this work

Is Kant's Rechtslehre Comprehensive?Thomas W. Pogge - 1998 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (S1):161-187.
Kant on wrongdoing, desert, and punishment.Thomas E. Hill - 1999 - Law and Philosophy 18 (4):407 - 441.
Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment.Thomas E. Hill - 1999 - Law and Philosophy 18 (4):407-441.
Kant on Punishment.Susan Meld Shell - 1997 - Kantian Review 1:115-135.

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