Capabilities

Abstract

We propose a definition of capability as a class intermediate between function and disposition as the latter are defined in Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). A disposition inheres in a material entity and is realized in a certain kind of process. An example is the disposition of a glass to break when struck, which is realized when it shatters. A function is a disposition which is (simply put) the rationale for the existence of its bearer. To say for example that a water pump has the function to pump water is to say that the pump exists because something was needed that would pump water. Capabilities are a special sort of disposition in that that, like functions, they can be evaluated on the basis of how well they are realized. They differ from functions in that their realizations are not the rationale – not the primary reason – for the existence of their bearers. Thus, a water pump may have many capabilities, including to be weatherproof, to run without lubricant, and so forth, but only one function. All functions are capabilities on the view we defend, but not all capabilities are functions. We develop a series of axioms to distinguish capabilities formally from both dispositions and functions and provide examples of the use of ‘capability’ in a variety of domains.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-12-20

Downloads
989 (#18,313)

6 months
180 (#18,939)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Eric Merrell
State University of New York (SUNY)
David Limbaugh
State University of New York (SUNY)
Peter Koch
Villanova University
1 more

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
In defense of proper functions.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.

View all 7 references / Add more references