Kantian Review 14 (2):1-37 (2010)

Melissa M Merritt
University of New South Wales
I take up Kant's remarks about a " transcendental deduction" of the "concepts of space and time". I argue for the need to make a clearer assessment of the philosophical resources of the Aesthetic in order to account for this transcendental deduction. Special attention needs to be given to the fact that the central task of the Aesthetic is simply the "exposition" of these concepts. The Metaphysical Exposition reflects upon facts about our usage to reveal our commitment to the idea that these concepts refer to pure intuitions. But the legitimacy of these concepts still hangs in the balance: these concepts may turn out to refer to nothing real at all. The subsequent Transcendental Exposition addresses this issue. The objective validity of the concepts of space and time, and hence their transcendental deduction, hinges on careful treatment of this last point
Keywords Kant  Transcendental Aesthetic  Transcendental Deduction  space and time
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DOI 10.1017/s136941540000145x
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References found in this work BETA

Kant's Transcendental Idealism.Henry E. Allison - 1988 - Yale University Press.
Kant and the Apriority of Space.Daniel Warren - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (2):179-224.

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