Maximality and consciousness


Abstract
Being conscious is intrinsic. Suppose P, a conscious human being, “shrinks” by losing an atom from her left index finger. Suppose that at the very first instant at which P has lost that atom, the atoms that then compose her remain just as they were immediately before “the loss.” This implies—assuming MS for reductio—that, just as those atoms compose a conscious object after the loss, so they composed a conscious object before the loss. Name that latter object ‘the atom-complement’.
Keywords Consciousness  Maximality  Metaphysics  Supervenience
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00248.x
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References found in this work BETA

Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Maximality and Intrinsic Properties.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):357 - 364.
Identity, Constitution and Microphysical Supervenience.Harold W. Noonan - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (3):273-288.

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Citations of this work BETA

Is Consciousness Intrinsic?: A Problem for the Integrated Information Theory.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30).
Unrestricted Animalism and the Too Many Candidates Problem.Eric Yang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):635-652.
Part‐Intrinsicality.J. Robert G. Williams - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):431-452.
Replies.Trenton Merricks - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):727–744.
Personal Identity, Consciousness, and Joints in Nature.Cody Gilmore - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (3-4):443-466.

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