Perdurance and Psychological Continuity

If persons endure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. That is one conclusion defended in my “Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity’ . Rea and Silver claim that my argument for that conclusion is sound only if a parallel argument is sound. The parallel argument concludes that if persons perdure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. In this paper, I show that Rea and Silver are mistaken. My argument is sound but the parallel argument is not
Keywords Continuity  Metaphysics  Personal Identity  Psychology  Rea, M  Silver, D
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DOI 10.2307/2653410
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