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Religious Belief and Self‐Deception
In Russell Blackford & Udo Schüklenk, 50 Voices of Disbelief. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 41–47 (2009)
Abstract
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Adèle Mercier ‐ religious belief and self‐deception holding no religious belief having a firstorder belief about an object or event having a second‐order belief about firstorder belief believing something differs from believing that you believe ‐ stronger sense believing that you believe something is not the same as believing it not believing that an eternity of bliss ‐ awaits the pure and innocent free will defense ‐ response to problem of evil religion is all about believing ‐ that one's beliefs are right and not about having right beliefs
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Citations of this work
Why medical professionals have no moral claim to conscientious objection accommodation in liberal democracies.Udo Schuklenk & Ricardo Smalling - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (4):234-240.
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