Sexual Desire and the Importance of Marriage in Kant's Philosophy of Law

Ratio Juris 27 (3):330-343 (2014)
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Abstract

In his moral writings, Kant states that moral duty cannot be derived from “the special characteristics of human nature.” This statement is untenable if one takes seriously Kant 's moral views on sexual desire. Instead close study reveals that considerations based on both morality and nature play a role here. The combination of these two elements leads to inconsistencies and difficulties in Kant 's understanding of sexual desire, but they enable us to better understand the importance Kant attributes to marriage within his philosophy of law

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Thomas Mertens
Radboud University Nijmegen

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References found in this work

Practical philosophy.Immanuel Kant - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mary J. Gregor.
Kant and Sexual Perversion.Alan Soble - 2003 - The Monist 86 (1):55-89.
Sex and Social Justice.Patrick D. Hopkins - 2000 - Hypatia 17 (2):171-173.
Kant and the marriage right.Donald Wilson - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):103–123.

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