The force of dissimilar analogies in bioethics

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32 (2):117-128 (2011)

Guido Pennings
University of Ghent
Although analogical reasoning has long been a popular method of reasoning in bioethics, current literature does not sufficiently grasp its variety. We assert that the main shortcoming is the fact that an analogy's value is often judged on the extent of similarity between the source situation and the target situation, while in (bio)ethics, analogies are often used because of certain dissimilarities rather than in spite of them. We make a clear distinction between dissimilarities that aim to reinforce a similar approach in the source situation and the target situation and dissimilarities that aim to undermine or denounce a similar approach. The former kind of dissimilarity offers the analogy more normative force than if there were no dissimilarities present; this is often overlooked by authors who regard all relevant dissimilarities as detrimental to the analogy's strength. Another observation is that an evaluation of the normative force of an analogy cannot be made independently of moral principles or theories. Without these, one cannot select which elements in an analogy are morally relevant nor determine how they should be interpreted
Keywords EGG DONORS  DONATION  STEM-CELL RESEARCH  bioethics  ethical reasoning  analogy  dissimilarity  CASUISTRY  PAYMENT  OOCYTES
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DOI 10.1007/s11017-010-9165-6
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References found in this work BETA

Principles of Biomedical Ethics.Tom L. Beauchamp - 1979 - Oxford University Press.
Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics.John Arras - 1991 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (1):29-51.

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