Theoretical identity, reference fixing, and Boyd's defense of type materialism

Philosophia 34 (2):169-172 (2006)
In his "Materialism without Reductionism: What Materialism Does not Entail," Richard Boyd answers Kripke's challenge to materialists to come up with a way to explain away the apparent contingency of mind-brain identities. Boyd accuses Kripke of an imaginative myopia manifesting itself as a failure to realize that the more theoretical term in the identity is fixed by contingent descriptions - descriptions that might pick out otherworldly kinds of neural events where C-fibres are absent. If this is something we can confuse in the imagination with actual C-fibre firings, then we have an explanation of the apparent contingency of the necessary identity 'Pain=C-fiber firings.' However, for this to succeed it must be the case that the reference of 'C-fiber firings'€™ is fixed by some contingent description, which is false. Boyd, I submit, has failed to answer Kripke'€™s challenge after all.
Keywords theoretical identity  Richard Boyd  materialism
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-006-9024-x
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