Philosophy of Science 47 (1):69-81 (1980)

Authors
Gary Merrill
University of Rochester (PhD)
Abstract
In "Realism and Reason" Hilary Putnam has offered an apparently strong argument that the position of metaphysical realism provides an incoherent model of the relation of a correct scientific theory to the world. However, although Putnam's attack upon the notion of the "intended" interpretation of a scientific theory is sound, it is shown here that realism may be formulated in such a way that the realist need make no appeal to any "intended" interpretation of such a theory. Consequently, it can be shown that realism is immune to Putnam's criticism and that attempts at reformulating this criticism are not likely to meet with success
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DOI 10.1086/288910
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References found in this work BETA

Realism and Reason.Hilary Putnam - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
Laws of Nature.Fred I. Dretske - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (2):248-268.
Realism and Reason.Hilary Putnam - 1977 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 50 (6):483-498.
The Pragmatics of Explanation.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (2):143-150.
To Save the Phenomena.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (18):623-632.

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