Philosophia 32 (1-4):383-388 (2005)

Don A. Merrell
Northwest Arkansas Community College
In his (1977) "Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian Intuitions," Colin McGinn argues that Donald Davidson's anomalous monism is untouched by Kripke's (1980) argument against the identity theory. The type-identity of the physical with the mental may very well fall at the feet of Kripke's powerful arguments, but a token identification, argues McGinn, is left standing due to the simple fact that token physicalism countenances a kind of imagined separation of token mental states with their corresponding token physical states. If McGinn is correct, a full-blooded physicalism is consistent with Kripke's Cartesian intuitions regarding the non-identity of the mental and the physical. But I think McGinn is mistaken. In particular, McGinn misunderstands the nature of an "epistemic counterpart" of a token pain. So contrary to McGinn, token physicalism does not seem to be able to defend against Kripke after all.
Keywords McGinn, Colin  Identity  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Kripke, Saul
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Reprint years 2007
DOI 10.1007/BF02641632
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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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