Authors
Melissa M Merritt
University of New South Wales
Abstract
For Kant, ‘reflection’ is a technical term with a range of senses. I focus here on the senses of reflection that come to light in Kant's account of logic, and then bring the results to bear on the distinction between ‘logical’ and ‘transcendental’ reflection that surfaces in the Amphiboly chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. Although recent commentary has followed similar cues, I suggest that it labours under a blind spot, as it neglects Kant's distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ general logic. The foundational text of existing interpretations is a passage in Logik Jäsche that appears to attribute to Kant the view that reflection is a mental operation involved in the generation of concepts from non-conceptual materials. I argue against the received view by attending to Kant's division between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ general logic, identifying senses of reflection proper to each, and showing that none accords well with the received view. Finally, to take account of Kant's notio..
Keywords Kant  18th-century logic  reflection  transcendental reflection  Critique of Pure Reason  transcendental logic
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DOI 10.1080/09608788.2015.1018129
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C. I. Lewis, Kant, and the Reflective Method of Philosophy.Gabriele Gava - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (2):315-335.

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