Errors in ‘The History of an Error’

British Journal of Aesthetics 56 (2):179-185 (2016)
Authors
Aaron Meskin
University of Leeds
Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley argue that relational theories of art are rooted in a misunderstanding of what it would take to falsify the family resemblance theories they are meant to supplant, and are incapable of meeting all the requirements a successful theory of art must meet. Hence, they are doomed to failure. We show that the arguments Neill and Ridley offer are rooted in misunderstandings about relational theories and the requirements for a successful theory of art. If relational theories must fail, it will not be for the reasons identified by Neill and Ridley.
Keywords art  definition of art  institutional theory of art
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/aesthj/ayv034
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Logical Structure of Philosophical Errors.John C. Harsanyi - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):349-357.
Errors in Science and Their Treatment in Teaching Science.Nahum Kipnis - 2011 - Science & Education 20 (7-8):655-685.
Errors Upon Errors: A Reply to Joyce.Stephen Finlay - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):535 - 547.
Descartes and the Theodicean Consequences of Human Error.Joel Thomas Tierno - 1992 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo
Teleology, Error, and the Human Immune System.Mohan Matthen & Edwin Levy - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (7):351-372.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-08-25

Total downloads
53 ( #122,789 of 2,293,895 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #48,995 of 2,293,895 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature