An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):387-402 (2012)

Abstract

The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist or individualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage foetus. Holists accord no moral status to any of these beings, assigning it only to groups to which they belong, while individualists such as welfarists grant an equal moral status to humans and many animals, and Kantians accord no moral status either to animals or severely mentally incapacitated humans. I argue that an underexplored, modal-relational perspective does a better job of accounting for degrees of moral status. According to modal-relationalism, something has moral status insofar as it capable of having a certain causal or intensional connection with another being. I articulate a novel instance of modal-relationalism grounded in salient sub-Saharan moral views, roughly according to which the greater a being's capacity to be part of a communal relationship with us, the greater its moral status. I then demonstrate that this new, African-based theory entails and plausibly explains the above judgments, among others, in a unified way.

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References found in this work

Practical Ethics.Peter Singer - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
The Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1797/1996 - Cambridge University Press.
The Case for Animal Rights.Tom Regan - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Noûs. Oxford University Press. pp. 425-434.

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Citations of this work

Artificial Intelligence and African Conceptions of Personhood.C. S. Wareham - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (2):127-136.
Core Aspects of Ubuntu: A Systematic Review.C. Ewuoso & S. Hall - 2019 - South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 12 (2):93.
Personhood and a Meaningful Life in African Philosophy.Motsamai Molefe - 2020 - South African Journal of Philosophy 39 (2): 194-207.

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