Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):352-362 (2000)

Thomas Metzinger
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz
Zoltan Jakab has presented an interesting conceptual analysis of the ineffability of qualia in a functionalist and classical cognitivist framework. But he does not want to commit himself to a certain metaphysical thesis on the ontology of consciousness or qualia. We believe that his strategy has yielded a number of highly relevant and interesting insights, but still suffers from some minor inconsistencies and a certain lack of phenomenological and empirical plausibility. This may be due to some background assumptions relating to the theory of mental representation employed. Jakab
Keywords *Linguistics  *Perception  *Psychological Theories  Auditory Perception  Functionalism  Visual Perception
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DOI 10.1006/ccog.2000.0463
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References found in this work BETA

Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.
Consciousness, Color and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.
Phenomenal States.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
On the Persistence of Phenomenology.Diana Raffman - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 293–308.

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Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference.Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.

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