Love and emotional reactions to necessary evils

In Pedro Alexis Tabensky (ed.), The Positive Function of Evil. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 28-44 (2009)

Thaddeus Metz
University of Johannesburg
This chapter supposes that certain bads are necessary for substantial goods, and poses the question of how one ought to react emotionally to such bads. In recent work, Robert Adams is naturally read as contending that one ought to exhibit positive emotions such as gladness towards certain ‘necessary evils’. A rationale he suggests for this view is that love for a person, which involves viewing the beloved as good, requires being glad about what is necessary for her to exist, even if it is something bad such as a war that should be hated considered apart from being required for her existence. I critically discuss this argument, aiming to enrich understanding of the implications of the normativity of love for proper emotions towards necessary evil.
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Morally, Should We Prefer Never to Have Existed?Saul Smilansky - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):655-666.

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