David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393 (2003)
A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of phenomenal opacity and phenomenal transparency are interesting instruments for analyzing conscious, self-representational content, and that their relevance in understanding reflexive, i.e., cognitive subjectivity may have been overlooked in the past
|Keywords||Consciousness Metaphysics Representation Self-reference Transparency|
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S. Llewellyn (2013). Such Stuff as Dreams Are Made On? Elaborative Encoding, the Ancient Art of Memory, and the Hippocampus. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (6):589-607.
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Benj Hellie (2007). That Which Makes the Sensation of Blue a Mental Fact: Moore on Phenomenal Relationism. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66.
Rachel Wood & Susan A. J. Stuart (2009). Aplasic Phantoms and the Mirror Neuron System: An Enactive, Developmental Perspective. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):487-504.
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