Dissertation, University of Reading (2018)

Abstract
This thesis is about what a normative reason is and how reasons relate to oughts. I argue that normative reasons are to be understood as relational properties of favouring or disfavouring. I then examine the question: What is the relation between reasons, so understood, and what we ought to do, believe, or feel? I argue that the relation is an explanatory one. We should explain what we ought to do in terms of reasons, and not the other way around. This view faces a number of difficulties, in particular in accounting for supererogatory acts and the distinction between an action being required and an action being recommended. The analysis that I provide explains how we can solve these problems. In providing such an analysis, this thesis aims to be a contribution to the discussion of how we might elucidate the structure of what is sometimes called normativity.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,558
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.

View all 117 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop?Ulrike Heuer - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (3):1-25.
Reasons and Value – in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account.Jussi Suikkanen - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.
What’s Wrong with Moorean Buck-Passing?Francesco Orsi - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.
A Very Good Reason to Reject the Buck-Passing Account.Alex Gregory - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):287-303.
Wrongness and Reasons.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):137 - 152.
Naturalism and the Buck-Passing Account of Value.Francesco Orsi - 2006 - Philosophical Writings 32 (2):58-77.
The Wrong Kind of Reasons.Nye Howard - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 340-354.
Conflicts of Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
Not So Enticing Reasons.Simon Robertson - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):263-277.
Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-06-17

Total views
16 ( #595,004 of 2,348,549 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #237,836 of 2,348,549 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes