Sense and the identity conception of truth

European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1041-1056 (2018)
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Abstract

The identity conception of truth holds that a thinkable is true just in case it is a fact. As such, it sets itself against correspondence theories of truth, while respecting the substantive role played by truth in respect of enquiry. In this article, I motivate and develop that view, and, in so doing, promote a particular conception of sense. This allows me to defend the view from two substantial criticisms. First, that the identity conception of truth is incoherent in respect of its treatment of objects in the realm of reference, and, second, that it is committed to a view of the world in which ordinary objects have no place.

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Steven Methven
Oxford University

Citations of this work

Truth without Dependence.Robert Trueman - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):89-121.
The Tractatus on Truth.Daniele Mezzadri - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (9):e12937.

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References found in this work

On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
The thought: A logical inquiry.Gottlob Frege - 1956 - Mind 65 (259):289-311.

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