Philosophica 77 (2006)

Authors
Federica Russo
University of Amsterdam
Abstract
Causal analysis in the social sciences takes advantage of a variety of methods and of a multi-fold source of information and evidence. This pluralistic methodology and source of information raises the question of whether we should accordingly have a pluralistic metaphysics and epistemology. This paper focuses on epistemology and argues that a pluralistic methodology and evidence don’t entail a pluralistic epistemology. It will be shown that causal models employ a single rationale of testing, based on the notion of variation. Further, I shall argue that this monistic epistemology is also involved in alternative philosophical theories of causation
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References found in this work BETA

Causality.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Causation in the Social Sciences: Evidence, Inference, and Purpose.Julian Reiss - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):20-40.
Correlational Data, Causal Hypotheses, and Validity.Federica Russo - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):85 - 107.
Variational Causal Claims in Epidemiology.Federica Russo - 2009 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 52 (4):540-554.

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