Are constitutional rights personal?

Legal Theory 6 (4):405-422 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Professor Matthew Adler has argued that many constitutional rights are not personal moral rights, but that are pragmatic and instrumental in nature. 1 The reason rights are not personal, in Adlerthe constitutionality of a statute depends not just on how it affects someone, but on what it sayspersonal” legal disability that would set him apart from any other citizen, and is, therefore, not enforcing a personal right. Instead, Adler believes that constitutional rights are better understood as positive-law creations that allow citizens to sue as private attorneys-general

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Personal rights and rule-dependence.Matthew D. Adler - 2000 - Legal Theory 6 (4):337-389.
Beyond Rights.John Laws - 2003 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 23 (2):265-280.
Specifying Constitutional Rights.John Oberdiek - 2010 - Constitutional Commentary 271 (1).
Human rights and narrated lives: the ethics of recognition.Kay Schaffer - 2004 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. Edited by Sidonie Smith.
The Influence of Economic Crisis on the Constitutional Doctrine of Social Rights.Toma Birmontienė - 2012 - Jurisprudencija: Mokslo darbu žurnalas 19 (3):1005-1030.
Defending the Right To Do Wrong.Ori J. Herstein - 2012 - Law and Philosophy 31 (3):343-365.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-23

Downloads
14 (#842,546)

6 months
3 (#439,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references