Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):214-218 (2018)

Authors
Russell Meyer
University of Wollongong
Abstract
In line with proponents of 4E cognition, Gallagher [2019] is concerned that many cognitive phenomena are not amenable to decomposition strategies since their very nature is to be constituted extensively. By contrast the received view on causal explanation—the mechanistic account [Craver 2007]—emphasises the necessity for decomposition in explaining natural phenomena and insists on a sharp distinction between causal versus constitutive relations. I propose that removing the requirement that constitutive relations cannot also be causes helps to ease this tension between explanation and Gallagher’s non-decompositional stance, per Leuridan [2012]. Further, I draw on Froese et al.’s [2013] minimal model of social cognition to argue that constitutive relations can and do act as causal difference-makers in the Woodwardian sense [Woodward 2003].
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DOI 10.1080/24740500.2018.1552100
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Review of M Aking Things Happen.Eric Hiddleston - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):545-547.

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