Analysis 62 (4):305-308 (2002)

Authors
Ulrich Meyer
Colgate University
Abstract
It is a popular view amongst some philosophers, most notably those with Quinean views about ontological commitment, that scientific theories are first-orderizable; that we can regiment all such theories in an extensional first-order language. I argue that this view is false, and that any acceptable account of science needs to take some modal notion as primitive.
Keywords Scientific Theories  First-order Logic  Theorietical Properties  Indispensability Argument
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00374
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How to Apply Mathematics.Ulrich Meyer - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):17-28.
Modal Property Comprehension.Ulrich Meyer - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):693-707.

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