Moral Reflection: Beyond Impartial Reason

Hypatia 8 (3):21 - 47 (1993)
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Abstract

This paper considers two accounts of the self that have gained prominence in contemporary feminist psychoanalytic theory and draws out the implications of these views with respect to the problem of moral reflection. I argue that our account of moral reflection will be impoverished unless it mobilizes the capacity to empathize with others and the rhetoric of figurative language. To make my case for this claim, I argue that John Rawls's account of reflective equilibrium suffers from his exclusive reliance on impartial reason.

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Diana Meyers
University of Connecticut

Citations of this work

Impartiality.Troy Jollimore - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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