Analysis 62 (3):211–216 (2002)
The aim of this paper is to draw attention to a conﬂict between two popular views about time: Arthur Prior’s proposal for treating tense on the model of modal logic, and the ‘Platonic’ thesis that some objects (God, forms, universals, or numbers) exist eternally.1 I will argue that anyone who accepts the former ought to reject the latter.
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Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Time Relations.Rafael De Clercq - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):386 - 402.
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