Theoria 82 (4):4-28 (2016)
AbstractWe are occasionally responsible for our beliefs. But is this doxastic responsibility analogous to any non-attitudinal form of responsibility? What I shall call the consequential conception of doxastic responsibility holds that the kind of responsibility that we have for our beliefs is indeed analogous to the kind of responsibility that we have for the consequences of our actions. This article does two things, both with the aim of defending this somewhat unsophisticated but intuitive view of doxastic responsibility. First, it emphasizes the advantage of preserving, as the consequential conception does, the analogy with the non-attitudinal realm, i.e., with the realm of actions and their consequences. Second, this article regiments the most important objections to the consequential conception and answers them. The upshot is that there are no serious drawbacks to the consequential conception. There is, therefore, no reason not to favour it over accounts of doxastic responsibility that do not preserve the analogy with the non-attitudinal realm.
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References found in this work
Critique of the Power of Judgment.Hannah Ginsborg, Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (3):429.
The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.
Citations of this work
Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
Performance normativity and here-and-now doxastic agency.Matthew Chrisman - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5137-5145.
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