The Claims of Future Persons

Erkenntnis 83 (1):43-59 (2018)

Kirsten Meyer
Humboldt-University, Berlin
This paper defends a deontological egalitarianism in the ethics of future generations. Concerns about the non-identity problem have been taken as a reason to develop sufficientarian approaches to intergenerational justice. This paper argues for a solution to the non-identity problem that refers to the claims of future persons. In principle, the content of these claims could be spelled out with a sufficientarian and an egalitarian approach. What speaks against sufficientarianism, however, is that the sufficiency threshold, unless it is set very low, would have to be set arbitrarily. The hidden justification behind a higher threshold would be egalitarian. It draws its plausibility from the justified belief that future persons have a claim on us that we leave equally valuable shares of natural resources to them.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-016-9871-1
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References found in this work BETA

Why Sufficiency is Not Enough.Paula Casal - 2007 - Ethics 117 (2):296-326.
The Possibility of Altruism.John Benson - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):82-83.
Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?Elizabeth Harman - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):89–113.

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