Erkenntnis 84 (4):877-893 (2019)

Authors
Anne Meylan
University of Zürich
Abstract
In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject’s belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility.
Keywords epistemic voluntarism  epistemic responsibility  ethics of belief   reasons responsiveness, basic relation
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-018-9985-8
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