Res Philosophica 90 (2):261-275 (2013)

Authors
Anne Meylan
University of Zürich
Abstract
The value problem of knowledge is one of the prominent problems that philosophical accounts of knowledge are expected to solve. According to the creditsolution, a well-known solution to this problem, knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because the former is creditable to a subject’s cognitive competence. But what is “credit value”? How does it connect to the already existing distinctions between values? The purpose of the present paper is to answer these questions. Its most important conclusion is that credit value is not—contrary to what the upholders of the credit solution have frequently claimed—final value
Keywords value of knowledge  reliabilism  final vs. instrumental value
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ISBN(s) 2168-9105
DOI 10.11612/resphil.2013.90.2.10
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References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief.Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.John Greco - 2003 - In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press. pp. 111-134.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Value Problem of A Priori Knowledge.David Botting - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (2):229-252.

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