Metaphysica 8 (2):111-122 (2007)
Causal realists maintain that the causal relation consists in something more than its relata. Specifying this relation in nonreductive terms is however notoriously difficult. Michael Tooley has advanced a plausible account avoiding some of the relationâs most obvious difficulties, particularly where these concern the notion of a cross-temporal connection. His account distinguishes discrete from nondiscrete causation, where the latter is suitable to the continuity of cross-temporal causation. I argue, however, that such accounts face conceptual difficulties dating from Zenoâs time. A Bergsonian resolution of these difficulties appears to entail that, for the causal realist, there can be no indirect causal relations of the sort envisioned by Tooley. A consequence of this discussion is that the causal realist must conceive all causal relations as ultimately direct
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Dis-Unified Pluralist Accounts of Causation.Jason Taylor - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):388-401.
Causal Powers, Realization, and Mental Causation.Frank Hofmann - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):173 - 182.
Singular Causation Without Dispositions.María José García-Encinas - 2011 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (1):35-50.
The Interventionist Account of Causation and the Basing Relation.Kevin McCain - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):357-382.
Nonreductive Individualism Part II—Social Causation.R. Keith Sawyer - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (2):203-224.
Added to index2010-08-24
Total downloads12 ( #378,577 of 2,172,040 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #325,337 of 2,172,040 )
How can I increase my downloads?